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Abstract 
There were evidence-prompted conclusions by many researches on the optimum 
currency area (OCA) theory that the European Monetary Union (EMU) is not an optimum 
currency area; and consequently, there were warnings about the dangers of a single 
monetary policy for the Eurozone because of the inability of the zone to fulfil the 
theoretical preconditions for an optimal currency area. The 2007 subprime crisis that 
transformed into global financial crisis ignited the Eurozone crisis of 2009 which 
substantially revealed some crucial flaws and inadequacies in the design of the Eurozone. 
This paper reviewed some literature on the original design of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the post-financial crisis EMU (the Eurozone crisis), evaluated various 
debates on the sustainability of the EMU, identified the financial crisis-exposed defects in 
the design of Eurozone and well as the flaws inherent in the original optimum currency 
area (OCA) theory and its application to monetary integration, while making further 
efforts in highlighting lessons these have for the current monetary integration in the 
developing blocs of Africa and the proposed monetary integration of Africa. There has 
been the desire for the African Monetary Union which aims at the creation of a unified 
currency for the African continent. The 1991 Abuja treaty set out six stages in the process 
of achieving a monetary union and a single currency for Africa by 2028. The strategy for 
African monetary integration is based on progressive economic and monetary 
integration of African economic communities (ECOWAS, EAC, SADC etc) which are 
regarded as building blocks of Africa. This proposed African common currency is to be known as ‘afro’. This prompted this writer to tag the area that would eventually adopt this common currency as ‘Afrozone’ in this paper. Some of the major Eurozone design 
flaws identified in this paper as those exposed by the Eurozone crisis are: (i) the absence 
of effective economic governance mechanism; (ii) the retention of banking supervision 
and resolution at national levels; (iii) the lack of financial back-stops and crisis resolution 
mechanisms at the union level; and (iv) defects in the design of the Eurozone's common 
central bank. This paper highlights fifteen Eurozone crisis lessons for a complete and 
sustainable ‘Afrozone’ being proposed for the continent of Africa by 2028. 
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1. Introduction 
Many researches on the optimum currency area (OCA) theory have evidently concluded 
that the Eurozone is not an OCA and consequently, as they were giving warnings about the dangers of a single monetary policy for the zone because of the zone’s inability to fulfil 
the OCA theoretical preconditions for an optimal currency area.1 The Eurozone crisis of 
2009 (propelled by the 2007 subprime crisis that transformed the global financial crisis) 
substantially revealed some crucial flaws and inadequacies in the design of the Eurozone. 
Initially, from the second half of the 1980s, a large body of monetary integration 
researches could reveal: (a) how the EMU was to be designed; (b) the conditions that were necessary for the success of the ‘proposed’ monetary union; and (c) the impending 
dangers of not establishing a true and genuine monetary union in Europe.2 De Grauwe 
(1992) developed the first monetary integration model while Fratiani and von Hagen 
(1992) and Gros and Thygessen (1992) gave some insights on the benefits and costs of 
monetary unifications. As Eichengreen and von Hagen (1995) developed fiscal policy and 
fiscal federalism issues in a monetary union, De la Dahesa and Krugman (1993) and Krugman and Venables (1993) revealed the ‘regional and agglomeration effects of a 
monetary union’.  Nevertheless, the aim of this paper was an extensive review of 
literature on the original design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the post-
financial crisis EMU (the Eurozone crisis), identifying the financial crisis-exposed 
architectural flaws of the Eurozone from which the proposed African monetary 
integration could draw some beneficial lessons.  
The global interests in the formation of currency union arrangements were ignited and 
stimulated by the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
adoption of the euro as a single currency on 1 January 1999. There is currently a special 
project for an African monetary cooperation.3 The continent of Africa has the largest 
number of countries and the largest number of currencies. Following the monetary 
integration trends in Europe, there has been the desire for the African Monetary Union 
                                                          
1 Some these research works are carried out by Krugman (1993), Decressin and Fatas (1995), McKinnon (2001), 
Wyplosz (2006), among others. 
2Some of these research works were contained in ‘The European Monetary System’ edited by Giavazzi, Micoss and Miller (1998); ‘A European Central Bank?’ edited by de Cecco and Giovaninni (1998) and various editions of ‘Monitoring European Integration’ and annual reports produced by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 
from 1990-2003 as referenced by de la Dehesa (2012). 
3 This is in respect of the currency unions sharing the two separate CFA francs in Central Africa and West Africa 
respectively 
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which aims at the creation of a unified currency for the African continent. This proposed African common currency is to be known as ‘afro’. This prompted this writer to tag the area that would eventually adopt this common currency as ‘Afrozone’ in this paper. 
Economists and other analysts consider the step towards a stronger and great African 
regional integration to be in the interest of Africa because of the small size (in terms of 
economy and population) of many African countries. Over decades ago, many regional 
economic groups were evolved in Africa for the purpose of free trade. Some of these 
regional economic groups still exist till date while some are modifications and 
rejuvenations of those that were in existence during the colonial regimes in Africa.4 
Nevertheless, there are plans in pipeline for several currency unions within the regions 
of Africa as at present. This plan, set out in the 1991 Abuja Treaty, makes an African single currency the African Union’s long term goal. Article 44 of the 1991 Abuja Treaty states 
that “.......member states shall within a timetable to be determined by the Assembly (of the 
Organisation of African Unity), harmonise their monetary, financial and payments 
policies and boost intra-community trade in goods and services to further the objectives 
of the community and to enhance monetary cooperation among member states.”5 The 
1991 Abuja treaty set out six stages in the process of achieving a monetary union and a 
single currency for Africa by 2028.6 The strategy for African monetary integration is 
based on progressive economic and monetary integration of African economic 
communities which are regarded as building blocks of Africa. These economic 
communities are the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). 
This paper therefore evaluated various debates on the sustainability of the EMU and 
various revealed defects in the design of Eurozone and well as the flaws inherent in the 
original optimum currency area (OCA) theory and its application to monetary 
integration; while further efforts were made to highlight lessons these have for the 
current monetary integration in the developing blocs of Africa. 
 
                                                          
4
 Presently, South Africa’s Monetary Area and the CFA franc Zones in Central and West Africa respectively are the 
monetary integration arrangements that still exist. 
5 Regional Integration- http://www.uneca.org/aria3/chap1.pdf 
 
6 The 1991 Abuja Treaty which was signed on 3 June 1991 and was effective in May 1994 established the African 
Economic Community. 
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2. Historical Background of Monetary Integration of Europe 
The history of monetary integration in the Europe continent could be traced back to the 
emergence of the Austro-German Monetary Union which commenced in 1857 and lasted 
till 1861. Some of the other monetary unions among the European nations were the Latin 
Monetary Union which was in existence for sixty one years (1865-1926) and the 
Scandinavian Monetary Union that existed between 1873 and 1931. The German 
Monetary Union finally came into creation in 1876 after many stages of transformation; 
and this caused the creation of the Reichmark and the Reichsbank which were precursors 
of the former German currency, the Deutsche mark (DM) and the German central bank, 
the Bundesbank respectively (de Vanssay, 1999). Genuine efforts towards monetary 
integration in Europe were made after the World War II which Sanchis i Marco (2014) 
quoting Triffin (1962) described as the period of European ‘liberalism triumphant’. The 
two major monetary agreements followed: (i) Intra-European Payments and 
Compensation (which existed for two years – 1948-1950) and (ii) the European Payment 
Union (which lasted for seven years - (1950-1956) and this was regarded as the ‘first step 
towards convertibility' (Sanchis i Marco, 2014). 
The enthusiasm to have a stronger European monetary union (of single currency) grew 
between late 1960s and early 1970s with various plans (The Barre Plans of 1969, The 
Schiller Plan, The Werner Plan of 1970. The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) was preceded by the European Monetary Snake which 
lasted for sixteen years between 1972 and 1978. However, the 1969 initial plan for a 
single European currency was stalled by the 1971 collapse of the Bretton Wood System 
and the 1972/73 oil crisis; thus culminating into postponement until the momentum was 
gathered around the late 1980s and early 1990s with the 1989 Jacque Delors Report on 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), igniting the course by drawing a 3-stage plans 
towards realising the formation of EMU. Within this ten-year period (1992-2002) three-
stage plan was set towards adopting the single currency (the euro) with the particular 
aim of fostering the EU economies as regards inflation rates, interest rates, exchanges 
rates, budget deficits and public debts as stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
Eventually, by 1 January 2002, the euro single currency became operational as the single 
currency of twelve (of the fifteen) EU members.  
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The Economists' Views and the Monetarists' Views were the two opposing views as at 
transitory period of the formation of the Eurozone. The argument of the Economists' was 
that it was necessary to have deep economic integration before the final introduction of 
euro (at the last stage of the process). Various economic convergence criteria (to be met 
by intending members of the 'proposed monetary union' for a long term before the 
adoption of the euro) are the products of the Economists'. On the other hand, the 
Monetarists' argument was that the creation of a common currency would automatically 
cause some economic adjustments in the direction of making a monetary zone 
(Eurozone) an OCA, placing huge reliance  on the numerous institutional changes that 
were expected  to accompany the creation of the monetary union (Eurozone) and the 
introduction of the single currency (euro) and not when a common central bank (the sole 
monetary authority) and a union-wide economic/fiscal policies are instituted. Despite 
the willingness of the founding members of the Eurozone to transfer monetary control to 
common central bank, they were unwilling to release the national powers in financial 
regulation, supervision and fiscal policy and other non-monetary policy aspects. As 
established by the Maastricht Treaty, euro succeeded national legacy divergences with 
the Eurozone. This is in contrast with historical example of monetary union, and this 
made the euro a currency without a nation, characterised by European institutions and 
an association of member nations. 
Previous and present monetary arrangements show some similarities and differences 
with trends and records of failures, crises and sustained successes. The aim of creating 
the Latin Monetary Union (LMU) in 1865 was the harmonisation of the gold and silver 
contents of the coins of members of the monetary union (Belgium, France, Italy and 
Switzerland). This depicted the LMU not as a monetary union, but a 'coinage union' that 
lacked common unit of account, common central bank and common political framework. 
The legal tender in the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU) which comprised of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden were coins, gold, silver and bronze. These member 
countries' central bank operated current accounts with each other. With this, they were 
drawing bankers' drafts at par on each of the currencies. However, economic policy 
coordination in the SMU was lacking, individual country's currency was maintained, 
while the three central banks involved were independent (operating different monetary 
policies). Anglo-Irish (A-I) Monetary Union was one of the many 'monetary unions' that 
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operated in small scale with a mix of large and small economies. The legal tender in one 
country was acceptable in the other countries within this monetary union which began 
in 1922 (on Ireland independence) and collapsed in 1979. During the colonial days, the 
currency board system was in operation. Under this system, dependent nations and 
colonial territories were issuing their respective currencies. The key feature was that 
local currencies were freely exchanged (at par) for foreign currency while enough 
foreign-denominated must be available to cover the entire monetary base liabilities 
(O’Rouke and Taylor, 2013). Currency boards (CB) were characterised by the absence of 
a single currency and a common central bank while member countries can leave the 
currency arrangement at any time. The gold standard (GS) as a series of country-by-
country monetary regimes was an arrangement under which there were linkages in 
currency values and price of gold; and monetary authorities are obliged to hold reserves 
that would be sufficient enough to make the commitment involved to be more credible. 
Strictly speaking, the gold standard was not a formal exchange rate agreement, but later 
became a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime when the prices of gold became almost 
harmonised in different countries. Salient feature under the gold standard systems were: 
(i) the operation of individual currencies; (ii) individual central banks; (iii) separate 
political sovereignty; and (iv) independent financial sovereignty. Countries involved 
were free to cut the currency/gold linkages at any time, if they so wished.  
Globally, the history of monetary unions shows that many previous efforts at durable 
monetary union failed. Therefore, the assumption that the Eurozone could not fail, 
following the trends in history, may be unreasonable. The success and durability of the 
monetary integration of the United States (US) could partly be attributed to the features 
of fiscal and political union that are visible in this monetary union. The Eurozone lacks 
these elements including banking union, risk-sharing mechanism of automatic fiscal 
transfers among its members. A monetary union that is lacking sufficiently large fiscal 
machinery would in the long run, find it difficult to function effectively. There could be 
political instability in a monetary union if appropriate fiscal tools that could soften the 
effects of asymmetric economic shocks are lacking.7  
                                                          
7
 Within a monetary union, shocks are asymmetric when the economy of the entire monetary region is affected 
by an economic shock (sharp exchange rate appreciation or domestic banking crisis) in disproportional ways. 
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The features of the United States' monetary system show that the US is truly a monetary 
union that gradually evolved a common central bank, a fiscal union and a banking union. 
The monetary union goes beyond an arrangement for hard exchange rate peg among 
member states. Political union preceded monetary union in the US. These are the 
undoubted feature that guaranteed the remarkable successes and sustainability of the US 
monetary union. The EMU which has a single currency and a common central bank whose 
aim is price stability (maintaining inflation at less than 2% levels) has successfully 
removed exchange rate risks among its members. The features of the EMU according to 
its original design show that: (i) banking supervision crisis resolution and deposit 
insurance are handled at the national levels; (ii) a banking union is lacking; (iii) there is 
an absence of a common fiscal authority; (iv) there is no government bail-out of member 
states; (v) there is no provision for an exit from the monetary cooperation arrangement. 
Table 1 below provides brief comparative features of these past and present monetary 
unions (including the EMU): 
Table 1: Comparison of Some Past and Present Currency/Monetary Unions 
Properties: LMU SMU A-I CB GS US EMU 
*Elimination of exchange rate variability: 
*Elimination of national currencies: 
*Easy exit: 
*Temporary escape clause: 
*Common central bank: 
*Mutual acceptability of paper currency: 
*Fiscal union: 
*Political union: 
*Banking union:  
*Symmetry of the union: 
*High labour mobility: 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Partial 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Partial 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Varies 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Varies 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Partial 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No Author’s compilation 
Some useful lessons are however, derivable for the African monetary integration project 
from the features of some past and present monetary unions. The brief analysis 
undertaken under this sub-section indicates that the US monetary union and the EMU are 
still existing (apart from the CFA monetary zones in the Central and West African sub-
region). While the US monetary union (which had a political union preceding a monetary 
union) is highly successful, the EMU on the other, while gambling to develop a monetary 
union (without a political union, banking union and fiscal federalism) is currently 
struggling to get out of the financial crises which is affecting its stability. This is one of the 
justifications for a study on what the African monetary integration projects can derive 
from the Eurozone crisis while taking cognisance of the features of the US monetary union 
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which in turn, guaranteed its success. Stemming from this background, this paper places 
value on the initial assessment of the Eurozone as an optimal currency area, consider 
various discussions on the financial crisis and of the sustainability of the Eurozone, by highlighting those ‘design failures’ and some important and relevant factors and issues 
that were not included in the theoretical evaluation of the EMU in particular and 
monetary unions in general, highlighting the extent to which the experiences of the 
Eurozone and other advanced monetary union have served as relevant lessons for 
monetary union initiatives within the African continent. 
3 Assessment of the Eurozone as an Optimal Currency Area (OCA)8 
Around the inception of the euro (the third stage of EMU development), academic literature offered a measure of ‘convergence mountain to be climbed’ by prospective 
members of the Eurozone. The expected characteristics of the EMU member states in 
determining the likely success or failure of the Eurozone (as offered by the OCA theory) 
are as summarised in Table 2 below showing how the entire Eurozone fared in the 
achievement of some of the crucial convergence factors at the start of the Eurozone: 9 
Table 2: Summary of Conclusions in Literature on the Posture of the EMU in the Context of the 
Convergence Factors 
 Convergence Narration of Achievement in Eurozone 
 Labour Mobility 
 
A variety of measures pointed to the conclusion that labour 
mobility and the speed of labour market adjustment are lower 
in Europe when compared with the United States. Furthermore, 
in a 2007 economic survey of the EU, the OECD established that 
geographic labour mobility was low as only 4% of the EU 
workforce have worked lived outside their domestic 
environments, while language barrier was a crucial issue.10 
 Degree of Commodities 
Market Integration 
This relates to the similarity in production structures of the 
Eurozone member countries. In assessing the UK's proposed 
membership of the Eurozone, the UK when compared with 
Eurozone's member countries there were evidence to support 
the inference that there is dissimilarities in production 
structures of the countries analysed, and that the UK's greater 
reliance on export involving high-tech production and on a huge 
percentage of home owner-occupiers were subjected to variable 
rate of interest.11 
 Openness and Size of the 
Economy 
Many literatures on EMU got the evidence to suggest that this is 
a criterion fulfilled as the degree of openness within the 
Eurozone were high across member countries. Willett et al 
                                                          
8 This section borrows largely from evidence gathered and conclusions made by The New Europe Trust (2001). 
9With reference to Brian Burkitt as quoted by The New Europe Research Trust (2001).  
10 Eichengreen (1990) in an assessment of labour mobility and the incidence of shock in Europe, made the 
comparison of comparable measures between Europe on one hand and Canada and the United States of the other 
hand. 
11 Weber (1991) and Eltis (1996) 
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(2010) in investigating the endogeneity of the OCA theory 
observed the rapid growth in the intra euro trade/GDP ratios of 
the Eurozone countries, moving from the mid-90s 25% to above 
40% by 2000.12 The evidence got by Trichet (2006) shows 
increase in total intra Eurozone trade in goods and services 
from 31.5% to 37.5% between 1998 and 2005.13 
 Degree of Commodity 
Diversification 
Because most Eurozone countries are industrialised nations, it 
would be very easy for these countries to fulfil this condition of 
high level of commodity diversification. 
 Fiscal Integration Eichengreen et al (1990) and Feldstein (1992) established that 
as at the time of going into the EMU, the least satisfied condition 
was the fiscal federation criteria, a flaw described by De Grauwe 
(2014) as a 'major design failure'. Pasimeni (2013) making 
references to the 'Marjolin Report' of 1975 and the 'MacDougall 
Report' of 1977 highlights that the problem of a common fiscal 
capacity at the European level was well noticed. MacDougall 
(1992) concluded that for a foreseeable future, there may not be 
significant development of intra-Eurozone fiscal transfer 
subsequently after the start of the Eurozone. 
 Degree of Political Integration Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) among other literature on the 
establishment of the Eurozone concluded that as at the 
commencement of the Eurozone, monetary union was placed 
above political union. 
 Similarities in Inflation At the stage of entering the EMU, most Eurozone member state 
(courtesy of their ERM membership) took on economic policies 
that strategically caused them to achieve similarities in inflation 
rates, though this was at the cost of high employment rated 
across the whole of Europe (Baimbridge et al, 1998). 
 Price and Wage Flexibility Results from many studies on price and wage flexibility show 
that there were evidences to support the claims that as at the 
time of going into EMU, there were substantial wage-price 
rigidity across Europe.14  Source: Author’s compilation 
What could be infer from the above is that many of the countries currently operating 
within the euro system failed to climb the ‘mountain’ depicted by the OCA characteristics 
as specified by the theory and as expressed above. 
4  The Eurozone Crisis: Origin and Causes 
Deficiencies and incompleteness of the construction of the Eurozone were exposed by the 
financial crisis which clearly revealed that the euro area is not an OCA. There were beliefs 
in many quarters that the  financial crisis in the Eurozone (euro crisis) portrayed as ‘debt crisis’ principally emanated from the underlying problem of asset bubble (in the US) 
which resulted into bust or over indebtedness of the Europe sovereign that no longer 
have access to the financial market. Apart from this principal real nature of Eurozone 
                                                          
12 Though, the test of the assumption of the OCA theory failed in this respect. 
13 This is from a paper presented by Jean-Claude Trichet, the President of ECB at the 15th European Regional 
Conference of the Board of Governors in Paris on 31st March 2006  
14 Blanchard and Katz (1992), Eichengreen, (1991), (1993), Calmfors and Driffil, (1998) and Goodhart (1996). 
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crisis, the other major aspect of the financial crisis is the financial panic propelled by the 
underlying problem of asset bubble.15 The Europe continent was a ‘by-stander’ as at the emergence of the sparking of the 
financial crisis which originated in the US housing boom, leading to the rise in the 
subprime mortgage market and the following housing market busts caused by lax 
regulation and the consequential decline in the market. As an act of remedy, the Federal Reserve dramatically cut policy rates at the beginning of the 1990s while the ‘stand-byer’ 
ECB did not act in this direction. While the US recorded chronic current account deficit, the Eurozone’s current account, in contrast was ‘broadly balanced’. Though, Eichengreen (2012) identifies ‘isolated failure of some Europe’s financial institutions (like Fortis and Dexia)’ but none of these failures were as catastrophic as the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. 
This diffuses the conclusion in most Eurozone member countries that the Eurozone 
financial crisis emanated from outside Europe. In addition, substantial losses in mortgage 
markets were recorded by financial institutions within Europe, thus indicating risk 
management and internal control shortcomings within the Eurosystem (which are not 
American). 
Some of the defects and flaws in the design of the EMU were made manifest during the 
2008/2009 financial crisis. The OCA theory (Mundell, 1961) projected that a complete 
monetary union is optimal if there are similarities in economic structures of member 
state which would cause similar (symmetric) reactions to shocks. The Eurozone crisis is 
the form of asymmetric shock highlighted by the OCA theory. When there were 
downward movements in housing prices, these falls were more dramatic in some 
member countries than others and the resultant increase in the rate of unemployment 
were not similar in the Eurozone countries. Due to the ‘widening spreads and the associated credit default swaps’, public finances of many Eurozone member countries 
were strained (Eichengreen, 2009).16 Governments in the Eurozone recorded dramatic 
increases in public debts as a result of the need to act in avoidance of domestic banking 
collapse and ensure the sustenance of their various national economies. Presumably, 
given these situations, many Eurozone countries would have preferred different policy 
                                                          
15The two real nature of the financial crisis in the Eurozone are scenarios in which somebody in a hugely crowded theatre hall cries “fire”. Actually, there may be fire, but people may trample upon each other to death in panic rush to 
escape from the fire. There would be panic whether the alarm turns out to be real or false (Schmieding, 2012). 
16‘Spreads’ means the differences between 10-year government bond rate of Germany and those of each European 
country. 
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responses to the crisis situations. This depicts that the ‘one-size-fits-all monetary policy’ 
should have been out of the Eurosystem's design. The financial crisis was able to reveal 
the long-standing criticisms of the euro-sceptics about the design and architecture of the 
EMU because of the suggestions from many quarters that the EMU was responsible for 
the crisis or at least, worsened the financial crisis.  
The Eurozone crisis is better understood from the view point of the EMU's unique 
institutional set up in which member countries of the Eurozone came together operating 
one common monetary policy with seventeen (17) macroeconomic and fiscal policies. 
This implies a single currency area made up of many (17) sovereign member countries 
(one money, many economic and fiscal policies). These sovereign states were given 
freedom that is sufficiently enough to safeguard their individual diversity, establish their 
own business model, formulate their own fiscal policies and tailor their institutional and 
other economic and political policies in tune with their respective national preferences 
which are very likely to differ in many respects (like income distribution, roles played by 
the government in manipulating the economy). Member sovereign governments bore the 
consequences of these actions, creating members' vulnerabilities while the option of 
public debt mutualisation among the sovereigns was ruled out. In the first instance, the 
above factor combined together, causes the partial shift of fiscal recklessness from one 
sovereign to the others thus leading to fiscal deficit bias. For the monetary union as a whole, a country’s lack of fiscal sustainability has consequences arising out of the harmful 
nature of excessive public debts. In the Eurozone, excessive public debt caused upward 
movements of the long term interest rate for all members. The second instance is that 
Eurozone members' public debts were issued in a currency they cannot create.  
A favourable implication of the creation of the Eurozone and the introduction of the euro 
is the abundance of capital coming out of the elimination of exchange rate risks. These 
beneficially stimulated real estate investment and consumption (public and private). 
However, over time, there were decline in competitiveness while there were sharp 
increase in unit labour costs within the Eurozone. For instance, during the pre-euro crisis 
period following the formation of the Eurozone, there were per annum increase of 3.0% 
in Spain's unit labour cost, while Germany recorded -0.1% decline over same period. The 
2007 financial crisis opened up fiscal vulnerabilities apparent in sharp increases in 
affected member's interest rate and shift in investors' sentiment. These triggered the 
Eurozone crisis. 
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The crisis in the Eurozone could therefore be described as ‘systematic’ in nature, 
springing from the consequences of the flaws in the design, construction and 
implementation of the EMU project. The crisis can be described as self-inflicted crisis 
which could have been avoided. Specifically, the crisis is a repercussion of the failure to 
put some essential components in place for the formation of a monetary union viz: (a) 
failure to establish a banking union that should accompany the monetary union; (b) 
failure to institute a lender of last resort (LOLR) for sovereign borrowings;17 (c) 
inadequacy of surveillance and regulatory mechanism that should be expected to guide 
against potentially destabilising effects of credit flows within the monetary union and the 
build-up of members' states' current accounts imbalances; (d) too narrow focus on price 
stability (inflation moderation) on the overall at the monetary union's level at the 
expense of other macroeconomic targets like economic growth, employment, financial 
stability etc. (McDonnell, 2012). 
A thorough consideration of trends of events in the Eurozone since its design and take-
off reveal three main flaws in the design of the Eurozone. This is a signal that the 
designers of the EMU ' may have sufficiently internalised the implications of creating the 
euro as a currency without a state'.18 The discussions of the three broad categories of the 
EMU design flaws are made below in Boxes A to C The first major flaw in Box A was about 
the Eurozone's design failure to provide a mechanism for effective economic governance 
in which monetary policy adjustment could be imposed (at the monetary union level) on 
members that are out of line.19 
Box A: Major Flaw 1 - Absence of Effective Economic Governance Mechanism: 
In the practical sense, economic and employment policies meant for individual member countries were 
not enforced but largely ignored, hence the lack of effective tools to correct macroeconomic 
imbalances. Because of the irrevocably fixed exchange regime in the Eurozone, and with the 
assumption of high level of flexibility within the economy, it is only prices and costs adjustments that 
could correct cross country differences in competitiveness. However, output and employment should 
be adjusted (as federal funding is lacking in assistance) in situations of slow downward rigidity of 
prices and costs when there is slow implementation of structural reforms that are meant to address the 
rigidities in supply. It was observed that macroeconomic divergences in the Eurozone were also 
aggravated when competitive member nations enjoyed better economic growth (Landmann, 2011 and 
De Rougemont and Winkler, 2014).20  
Consequently, in the wake of the financial crisis, Eurozone countries that recorded recurring current 
account deficits, weak competitiveness, excessive private/public debts and other economic imbalances 
                                                          
17 The LOLR as an institution should have been with the responsibility and authority having the resources to fund 
borrowers face with liquidity crisis in order to avoid liquidity problem turning to solvency crisis within the monetary 
system and safeguard against moral hazards. 
18(Riet, 2013).  
19 Even as the Maastricht Treaty revealed an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 'economic' part was missing 
(Riet, 2013).   
20 Delor's Report admitted the underestimation of the Eurozone as a single market with a single currency 
exacerbating divergences among members. 
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specifically experienced the financial market vulnerabilities. Public sector funding stood as 
replacements for the reversed private sector capital flows. Although, in the aspect of fiscal policies, the 
Treaty specified limits of public sector deficits (budget balance and gross debts), including sanctions 
against erring members, the correction of excessive budget deficit was however sluggish while the 
enforcement of appropriate sanction was avoided. There were apparent resistance in 2003, by German 
and France to correct their excessive budget deficits. This caused a dent on the Eurozone's fiscal 
governance incentives meant to ensure sound public finances were further undermined when more 
flexibility in response to country-specific mitigating conditions were introduced in 2005 by the SGP.  
In the Eurozone, the after-effects of these (as the global financial crisis set in) were high levels of public 
sector debt rising further due to subsequent bank rescues, fiscal stimulus and austerity measures 
including economic recession. There were increases in sovereign bond yield and concerns for solvency 
due to liquidity stress resulting from the spread of market volatility to vulnerable Eurozone countries. 
The second major flaw in Box B is on the retention of the Eurozone’s banking supervision 
and banking resolution within Eurozone in the hands of sovereigns at national levels. 
Box B: Major Flaw 2 - Retaining Banking Supervision and Resolution at National Levels 
This ignores the trade-offs in the financial trilemma.  The Eurozone's financial integration (particularly 
in retail banking), due to its incomplete nature, allowed the accumulation of foreign short term 
liabilities and debt-based interbank liabilities, but concentrated their assets with real estate borrowers 
at home rather than diversifying the risks involved (Draghi, 2014). Banks' balance sheets are 
consequently made vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, external contagion effect due to the mismatch; 
and eventually, the sovereign governments bear the bail-out burden. Also, cross-border inter-country 
financial interaction further made the preservation of financial stability at natural levels worse. This 
caused the Eurozone's sovereign government to (a) act in line with their individual own banking rules 
in banking supervision within their domains; (b) use their local judgments in applying the European 
banking laws; and (c) made their own self decisions in recapitalising banks that were over-burdened 
with debts and in determining if forbearance is needed in handling non-performing loans in banks' 
portfolios. 
In a single market (like the Eurozone), when financial policies are formulated and implemented at 
national levels, close coordination of member states is necessary when handling international banks. 
Unfortunately, this failed to work well for the Eurozone during the crisis, as the need to maintain 
financial stability within the EMU caused the breaking-up (or restructuring at short notice) of cross-
border banks. There were no enough fiscal space in many member countries to the rescue of ailing 
banks. In some countries having large number of unviable retail banks, private sector was over-
indebted in addition to recording excessive liabilities, while the size of the banking sector in some 
over-banked countries enormously exceeded their GDP. The differing features of the Eurozone's 
financial system propelled a 'vicious feedback loop' between troubled banks that had their balance 
sheets reflecting large volumes of sovereign debts and the vulnerable sovereign governments that have 
fiscal spaces that were not enough for the rescue operations. The consequent increase in interest rates 
(lending and borrowing) resulted in huge creditworthiness fragmentation of Eurozone's financial 
market along national lines. The financial crisis also exposed the absence of the tools for the 
management of cross-border flows of capital and for the prevention of regional credit boom, and the 
Eurozone's common central bank could not handle these. There is also a lack of macro-prudential 
policies at the national levels (or coordinated at the union-wide levels). The EMU design shifted this to 
a future time. 
The third major faults explained in Box C rests of the failure of the EMU design to institute 
financial back-stops and crisis resolution mechanisms. 
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Box C: Major Flaw 3 - Lack of Financial Back-stops and Crisis Resolution Mechanisms at the Union 
Level 
At the Eurozone level, there was: (i) the lack of built-in financial backstops that could give supports to a 
sovereign government experiencing serious liquidity quagmire; (ii) the absence of a mechanism that 
would give room to insolvent national governments to organise the restructuring of their debts. The 
Eurozone's common central bank is forbidden from financing sovereigns as well as prohibiting 
measure forcing banks to preferentially finance national governments.21  Even with good purpose, 
convergence (entry) criteria and rules, the Eurozone architecture failed to incorporate crisis resolution 
mechanism in situation when a member country encounters harsh problems and could not access 
international financial markets. What such design depicted was a Eurozone of fair weather that could 
not be sustained in stormy weather. Owing to the heavy cross-border finance received by some 
Eurozone members during the first decade of the union, the sudden stop of these capital inflow made 
these countries to be vulnerable during crisis. So, when the high interest rates and funding difficulties 
came calling, sovereign governments fell into self-fulfilling defaults.22  
The essential 'sudden backstop' of official funding for Eurozone countries facing the sudden stop in 
international funding was lacking. These are the reasons why De Grauwe (2012) concluded that euro 
was characterised by a 'systematic fragility' because member countries of the Eurozone exposed to 
erratic capital inflow were opened to vulnerabilities and contagion. These countries lack the crisis-time 
support of a federal state and the option to seek for bail-out from other members of the union. 
Whenever these countries face huge shock, they rely on market expectations because they lack a 
central bank that could print the fiat currency needed for the redemption of their debts. It is therefore 
necessary to put in place, a process of getting rid of unsustainable debt and prevent contagion within 
Eurozone.23  
 
4.1 Defects in the Design of the Eurozone's Common Central Bank 
The European Central Bank (ECB), being the institution charged with the responsibility 
for making monetary decisions for Eurozone, is a centrepiece for the EMU. In 1999, 
when Eurozone was formed, the ECB took over the monetary decision making function 
of national central banks in all Eurozone countries. The institutional design of the ECB 
reveals come features and functions of the central bank. However, in literature, there 
had been many criticisms about the design of the ECB, particularly at the time the Euro 
area financial crisis erupted. In making explanations on the objectives and institutional 
design of the ECB, it is necessary to clearly differentiate between the two post-war 
models of central banking (the Anglo-French Model and the German Model) as 
expressed in the Table 3 below: 
                                                          
21 At the EU level, its members (or the EU itself) are not permitted to assume public sector commitment of a member 
country; although, a facility for assistance in time of balance of payment crisis are available outside the Eurozone, but 
at the EU. 
22 Gros (2012) revealed the noticeable gap between the uncontrollable default in the Eurozone crisis era and the 
partial default (attributed to inflation) during the EMS crisis period when countries participating in EMS then had 
their monetary policy independence and respective currencies and could devalue their currency for the avoidance of 
the tension in the financial market. 
23 As observed by Riet (2013), though the euro successfully maintained price stability, at the EMU level, 'complacent 
national policy making, accumulated national supervision of financial industry and the absence of macro-prudential 
tools to counter a credit-driven boom in overheating economies' of the Eurozone all came together to undermine the 
achieved price stability. 
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Table 3: The Post-war Models of Central Banking 
 Anglo-French Model German Model 
Objectives The central bank works towards 
achieving many equally-weighted 
policy objectives. 
The primary objective of the 
central bank is price stability 
(though, other objectives could be 
pursued on the condition that these 
other objectives do not work 
against price stability. 
Design The central bank has political 
dependent in which the 
implementation of monetary 
policy decisions are subject to the 
approval of the government. 
Government minister (of 
Finance) takes decisions on 
increasing or lowering interest 
rates. 
The central bank has political independence (as ‘the guiding principle’). Without 
government/political interference, 
the central bank takes decisions on 
interest rate. However, there is 
ambiguity on who (government or 
central bank) has the responsibility 
for exchange rate policy decisions  
Source: De Grauwe (2014) 
As at the point of deliberating the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of the ECB, 
the choice between the two models of central banking had to be made. The decision 
guiding the design of the EMU pushed the Anglo-French model aside and embraced to the 
German model. These were entrenched in the statute of the ECB and the Maastricht 
Treaty. Consequently, price stability maintenance was the primary objective of the ECB, 
though, the ECB was empowered to pursue other secondary objectives (as the need 
arises), with a condition that these secondary objectives should not interfere with the 
price stability (primary) objective.24 The Maastricht Treaty makes the position on 
political independence a necessity towards achieving price stability objectives clear as it 
states that the ECB and members of its decision making bodies shall not take instructions 
from government of any member-state community, institutions and bodies (or any other 
bodies) in the discharge of its duties.25 In his arguments, De Grauwe wondered why the 
German model of central banking prevailed despite the fact that as at the time of 
Maastricht Treaty negotiation, the Anglo-French model prevailed in almost all the EU 
member states. Two reasons were however, identified for the rejection of the Anglo-
French model in favour of the German model: (i) intellectual development (monetarists counter revolution) and (ii) Germany’s strategic position in the formation of EMU (De 
Grauwe, 2014). There was the conclusion that the ECB is regarded as a ‘conservative 
                                                          
24 Article 105 of the Maastricht Treaty   
25 Article 107 of the Maastricht Treaty   
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central banker’ because of the great weight attached to price stability as against less 
emphasis placed on output and employment stabilisation.26   Despite ECB’s primary and secondary objectives and its political interference ring-
fencing, the level of accountability of the ECB, by arrangement is low because of the lack 
of mechanism that would check if ECB is achieving its objectives (or not) and in applying 
sanction when and if it failed to fulfil its mandate. As rightly observed in literature, the 
ECB has more independence than other major central banks but by design, this was 
coupled with weaker degree of accountability; and this however goes against the theory that a central bank’s accountability should increase according to its degree of 
independence. For two identified reasons, ECB has been weak in accountability due to : 
(a) the lack strong political institutions in Europe that could exert control over ECB’s 
performance; (b) the vagueness of the Maastricht Treaty in defining other objectives of 
the ECB (apart from price stability), thus causing ECB to restrict its area of responsibility 
to inflation moderation thereby making it to be accountable only for its anti-inflationary 
performance.  
It is important to state here that the institutional framework of the Eurozone centres on 
the Eurosystem comprising of the ECB and national central banks (NCBs) of all the 
Eurozone countries. The Eurosystem is entrusted with the powers to make monetary 
policy for the EMU.27  Monetary policy decisions made by the Governing Council (made 
up of the ECB Executive Board and the Governor of the NGCs) are implemented by the 
ECB Executive Board that also gives instructions to the NCBs. An issue of concern here is 
that the ECB, just being a part of the Eurosystem, cannot take its own monetary policy 
decisions for Eurozone. There is a problem of high degree of decentralisation of the 
Eurosystem in which the NCB governors have clear majority (of 18 out of the total 24 
members) in decision making within the Governing Council.28 This consequently implies 
that the representations of regional interests are in the majority.29  
                                                          
26 Coming from series of analyses, De Grauwe (2014) concludes that the ECB is comparatively more conservative than 
the US Federal Reserve as ECB seems to apply greater importance to price stability, but more cautious in its reactions 
to business cycle movements than the US Federal Reserve. 
27 Currently, there are 18 national central banks in Eurosystem.   
28 The ECB Executive Board requires actions in unity for its decision to prevail.  
29 This is contrary to what obtain in some known decentralised central banks like the US Federal Reserve System’s 
Open Market Committee. However, an argument put forward by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) was that the Federal 
Reserve System was indecisive in taking decision towards averting the 1930 banking crisis due to the fact that there 
was no system-wide interest strong enough to counter the divergent regional interest, as the system was ‘torn apart by opposing regional interests’. 
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One further area of flaw in the design of the ECB is the absence of the powers of a ‘lender of last resort’, a deficiency that was grossly exposed by the financial crisis. Contrary to what was in place before the commencement of the single currency, Eurozone’s member countries (taking effect from their adoption of the euro) ceased to have ‘a lender of last resort’ powers which were earlier, within the functions of the respective national central banks. The euro became the ‘national currency of all Eurozone member countries, but 
what the Eurozone has is a ‘national currency’ without a traditional central bank that 
should perform the traditional central banking within the zone. When the euro crisis 
came, existing mandate of the ECB did not accord it with the position to give guarantee in 
favour of the redemption of government debts that matured, thereby causing loss of investors’ confidence, upward movements in interest rates and further financial 
problems and recession.  
Another aspect of the ECB architectural flaw is the lack of supervisory powers over the 
banking sectors with the zone. The monetary system of the Eurozone was designed in a 
way in which the responsibility for the supervision of banking was in the hands of the Eurozone’s member states while monetary policy was entrusted to the ECB. This peculiar 
way of banking supervision is problematic and inefficient. It appears conflicting. In recent 
years, there had been tremendous growth in the internationalisation of the banking 
system and this coupled with financial innovations, have caused banks to evade 
supervision and regulation.30 If in a monetary union, a central bank formulates and 
conducts monetary policy for a monetary union, and also serves as ‘lender of last resort’ 
providing liquidity during crisis, it therefore necessary to have a complementary 
centralised banking supervisory and regulatory institution/mechanism at the union-
wide level. The 2008 Eurozone financial crisis obviously established the strong need to 
centralise banking supervision and regulation within the monetary zone. 
Tables 4 to 6 below offer summaries and explanations on problems and flaws revealed 
by the financial crisis, of the design of Eurozone. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 De Grauwe (2014)  
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Table 4: Pre-Crisis Problems and Flaws Manifested by the Eurozone Financial Crisis 
 Problem/Flaw Explanations and Narration 
1 Failure of  the 
Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) 
*SPG is the monetary union’s cornerstone of fiscal prudence. 
*As at six year after the introduction of the euro (but before the 
euro crisis), between 2001 and 2006, one-third of Eurozone’s 
member countries violated the two fiscal criteria of the SGP – (i) 3% 
budget deficit ratio and (ii) 60% public debt ratio. 
*This violation, leading to high public debt, reduced trusts in the 
effectiveness of rule-based surveillance. 
2 Disregard of private 
sector 
vulnerabilities 
*The sole emphasis on fiscal issues during the pre-crisis era led to 
the neglect of the need to be conscious of the behaviour of private 
sectors and the watch for vulnerabilities. 
*Consequently, there were unsustainable credit and housing booms 
in some countries (Ireland, Spain) as well as structural imbalances 
(high current account deficits). 
3 Absence of effective 
tolls to foster 
structural 
adjustments 
*There was lack of proper mechanism to propel microeconomic and 
macroeconomic structural adjustments within the monetary union. 
*Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal demonstrated this lack. 
*Appropriate microeconomic adjustments should have been in the 
area of regulations and policies affecting businesses, market 
flexibility, banking etc.  
*Examples of appropriate macroeconomic adjustments tools are 
price and wages, external balances, aggregate changes in 
productivity. 
4.  Absence of 
mechanism for crisis 
resolution 
Sovereign debt crises within the Eurozone evolved as a surprise, 
causing policy makers of the currency area to improvise. 
*Though, there was post-crisis creation of financing mechanism 
(like the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) which both provided €500 billion). Such medium-term crisis resolution 
financing would have preferably been in a design in which the 
monetary union member state would not need to lend money to 
each other.  
*Banking union and centralised fiscal capacity would have been 
better appropriate. Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Table 5: Post-Crisis Problems and Flaws Manifested by the Eurozone Financial Crisis 
 Problem/Flaw Explanations and Narration 
1 Interdependence of 
banks and sovereigns 
*It is evident that there was ‘poisonous correlation’ between banking 
and sovereign debt crises due to the national bank resolution regimes and the home country bias in bank’s government bond 
holdings. Whenever a Eurozone member banking system falls into 
problem, the government of such country follow suit (as Ireland) and 
verse versa (as Greece). *Most Eurozone countries showed large size of their bank’s portfolio 
of domestic government bond larger than what obtained in the US 
(Meller and Pisani-Ferry. 2012) 
*A banking union would solve the problem. 
2 Interdependence of 
countries 
*There was stronger interdependence of countries than what was 
generally perceived before the crisis. 
*Defaults by governments and private sectors in a small member country can lead to ‘contagion’ as a larger country’s default could result in ‘melt down’. A bankrupt Italy, for instance, would lead to a 
bankrupt Germany banking which would meltdown other banking 
systems within the union, with an accompanying disruptive effect 
outside the monetary union. 
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3 Absence of lender of 
last resort 
*This indicates that governments of the monetary union’s member 
states borrow as if they borrow in foreign currencies when there is, 
in principle, a prohibition of monetary financing within the 
monetary union. 
*When the level of debt is low, such lack of a lender of last resort 
may not be a problem. 
4.  Lack of union-wide 
integrated fiscal policy 
*There is no institution responsible for the management of the monetary union’s fiscal stance. 
*Member countries implements fiscal policies that are deemed 
appropriate for their individual economies.  
*The aggregate of these decentralised fiscal policies would not result 
in a fiscal policy that is optimal for the monetary union as a whole. 
Darvas (2012) got evidence to show that while the aggregate fiscal 
position of the Eurozone is much better than that of the US in a study 
that covers a period between 1990 and 2017 projections, and that 
while the economic outlook is much more fragile in the euro area, 
there is the incidence of much stronger consolidation bias in the 
euro area as a whole than in the US. 
5 Downward spiral and 
negative feedback 
between the crisis and 
growth 
*In the Southern Europe adjusting countries where fiscal accounts 
are hard-pressed, there is ‘downward spiral’. 
*Fiscal adjustments in each of these countries lead to weaker 
economy which reduces public revenues and create further fiscal 
adjustment needs. 
*The negative feedback loop between the crisis and growth in the 
economically strong Eurozone countries is pronounced. 
* An economic automatic stabilisation tool is needed as solution in 
this respect – just like the employment insurance in the US. 
6 Executive and 
democratic deficit 
*The crisis reveals governance problems (apart from sovereign debt, 
growth and banking issues). *European policymakers’ responses were inadequate, partial and 
belated, consequently undermining credibility to resolve crises. 
*There was lack of decisive decision making processes that would 
have prevented the problem that surfaced. 
*Agreements on comprehensive solutions to issues and problems are 
technically and politically out of reach. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
Table 6: Crisis-Revealed Problems of Eurozone’s Financial System 
  
Problem 
 
Effects 
What would have 
prevented the occurrence 
of the problems 
 
1 
Cross-border financial 
intermediation (caused 
hugely by debt-based 
wholesale banking market 
integration 
*Vulnerability of member 
countries to shocks increased. 
*Caused sudden-stop problem. 
Comprehensive equity 
market integration. (This 
would have absorbed 
shocks confronted by the 
monetary union. 
 
2 
High level of risk exposure 
(relative to loss absorbing 
capital) and debt within the 
banking system in the 
currency area. 
*Demand for bail-outs as well as 
many needs for public financial 
assistance increased. 
*Prudential guidelines. 
*Lender of last resort. 
 
3 
The contrast between the ‘pre-crisis high degree of 
wholesale banking market 
integration and the absence 
of a system for the stability 
of the financial system. 
*The resolution of problems 
faced by the banks was delayed. 
*The economy of the entire 
monetary union was slowed 
down 
Banking union with three 
pillars: (i) a single 
supervisory mechanism; 
(ii) a single resolution 
mechanism; (iii) a common 
system of deposit 
insurance. Source: Author’s compilation. 
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4.2  Pre-Crisis Eurozone Governance and the Inherent Incoherence 
Before the 2007/2008 global financial crisis manifested, the structure of Euro area 
governance was believed not to be insufficient. The financial crisis could apparently 
reveal the three principal parties involved in the crisis as banks, national governments 
and the common central bank. The awkward structure of governance (reflecting the 
relationships among the common central bank (ECB), banks and national governments) 
was the root cause of the vulnerability of Eurozone to sovereign debt crisis. A key error 
of omission in the Maastricht Treaty was the failure to consider banking issues. This is 
further to the failure to establish coherent relationships among banks, governments and 
the common central bank (the ECB).  
Table 7: Governance Relationship Flaws exposed by the Eurozone crisis 
 Relationship Flaws Features 
1 Government to government In the Maastricht Treaty: 
*There was a provision with ‘no bail out’ clause. 
*This clause indicates that member governments in the 
Eurozone could not be requested to bail out a member 
government that is in trouble.  
2 Common central bank (ECB) 
to government 
In the Maastricht Treaty: 
*There was a provision with ‘no monetary finance’ clause. 
*This clause stated that the common central bank, (ECB) 
would not make credit available to member government; *This implies no ‘lender of last resort’ by the common 
central bank in favour of the member government.  
 Source: Author and Carlin and Soskice (2015) 
 
 
Table 8: Comparative Pre-crisis Governance in the US and the Eurozone 
 Governance factors The USA The Eurozone 
1 (i)Common shock; 
(ii) Financial 
stability; and (iii) 
Lender of last resort  
(i) Federal Reserve stabilises 
common shocks. 
(ii) Federal Reserve has the 
responsibility for financial 
stability 
(iii)The Federal Reserve 
serves as the lender of last 
resort to the Federal 
government and to the 
banking system, 
(i) ECB stabilised common 
shocks (in reaction to the crisis). 
 (ii) The ECB was not 
responsible for financial 
stability. 
(iii) The ECB was not the lender 
of last resort to member 
(national) governments. 
(iv) ECB served as the lender of 
last resort to the banking 
system, though this was not 
entrenched (explicitly) in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
2 Budgetary provision 
for stabilisation in 
times of asymmetric 
shocks 
*The federal budget provides 
stabilisation to the states 
whenever they encounter 
asymmetric shocks (for 
instance, through 
contributions to 
unemployment benefits and 
federal taxes). 
*There was no central (federal) 
government. 
*There was no stabilisation 
through European budget; 
because there was no European 
budget. 
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3 Budget rules *The states have balanced 
budget rules. 
*Member nations had no 
national fiscal autonomy which 
is subject to rule.  
4 Bank failure and 
government 
responsibility 
*States are not responsible for 
the failure of banks 
headquartered in their 
respective states. This is the  
responsibility of the federal 
regulators and the federal 
government 
*Member countries are 
responsible for the failure of 
banks headquartered in their 
respective countries. This is 
nether the responsibility of the 
Eurozone, federal regulators or a 
non-existing Eurozone 
government. 
5 Bail-out *The federal government does 
not bail-out delinquent states 
which are however allowed to 
default. 
*A ‘no bail-out’ clause was 
explicitly entrenched in the 
Maastricht Treaty which provides 
that member government would 
not be bailed out in times of crisis. 
 Source: Author and Carlin and Soskice (2015) 
These are relationships that would have been robust enough to face such financial crisis. 
Table 7 above apparently reflects the central elements of what was lacking in the bank-
government-common central bank relationships in Eurozone before the crisis. In order to drive home the understanding of Eurozone’s governance problems, it is useful to 
distinguish between the pre-crisis governance structures in a one-state monetary union 
(the US as a good illustration) and a multi-nation monetary union (like the Eurozone). 
Table 8 above displays these comparisons. 
 
5.  Further Review of Literature and Conclusions by Authors 
There were many other literature on the design flaws of the EMU, the Eurozone crisis and 
the implications of these for the sustainability of the monetary union. Some of these are 
highlighted in this section. 
5.1 Dashed Hopes  
There were research evidences as produced by Schwarts, (2013) to conclude that there 
was failure in realising the great hopes surrounding the euro as a currency intended (at 
its inception) to be as strong as the deutschemark; and that the hopes for the euro to serve as European’s unity symbol were dazed by the financial crisis which has created 
discords among the European Union members, thus indicating defective design of the 
euro. Originally, the euro was intended to be fashioned as 'a kind of gold standard for a 
system of fiduciary money', but with the escape clauses to make it less automatic, given 
the impossibility of devaluation (as under the gold standard) as the main building 
condition for the Eurozone member countries (Schwarts, 2013). Nevertheless, rather 
than being gold, the anchor was expected to be an issue rule that the ECB could manage 
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the single currency in non-rigid manner, implying the limitation to money creation in 
order to keep the purchasing power of euro stable over the years. The interpretation 
given to the rule by the ECB is that in the long term, the Harmonised Consumer Price 
Index (HCPI) should be moderated within the prescribed targets. This rule, however, led 
to excessive low interest rates during the financial crisis, with its accompanied explosive 
effects. Due to the boom, there were intention to delay the imposition of discipline 
imposed on the euro members because of the possibility of almost indefinite financing of balance of payment deficits through the ECB’s clearing system; and consequently, the ECB practically ‘stayed too far away from the automaticity of an anchored monetary system’ 
(Schwarts, 2013). One further design issue is that the euro was based on the idea of high 
degree of neutrality of money in Europe, thus giving room for the euro to be able to adapt 
to changing circumstances through relative price movements and not by means of 
monetary management. As the head of the Eurosystem, the ECB was conferred with the 
single mandate of maintaining price stability by the 2008 Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union. These prompted the conclusion that the parlous situation of euro 
indicates that at its conception, the currency suffered from fundamental defects and that 
these design flaws were capitalised upon by the Eurozone members to finance 
unsustainable fiscal policy (Schwarts, 2013). 
5.2 Possible Dangers for the Eurozone 
Gathering conclusions from economic research papers and books before and after the 
commencement of the euro, De la Dehesa (2012) highlighted main dangers that could be 
faced by the euro as a monetary union: (i) because capital and labour do not move freely 
among Eurozone member countries; and that prices and wages are not flexible within the 
Eurozone as they manifest in Canada and the United States, Eurozone is by implications, 
not an OCA. In fact, there were general awareness in 1999 that Eurozone members did 
not fulfil the conditions for a monetary union; (ii) consequent from (i) above, if Eurozone 
is not an OCA, a 'one-size-fits-all' monetary policy can be too tight for the matured 
Eurozone members witnessing slow growing internal demand coupled with lower 
inflation rate, such policy can therefore be too loose for the ‘catching-up’ and fast growing 
Eurozone members that display higher than average inflation rate; (iii) given the Eurozone’s evident production specialisation, some member countries can suffer 
asymmetric shock that does not affect other member because of the build-up of growing 
internal and external imbalances and exogenous shocks; (iv) there may be a mix of 
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negative  and positive asymmetric shocks in Eurozone’s member countries as a result of the ‘agglomeration’ of different productive sectors in some special areas within the euro 
area. This would be as a result of internal and external economies of scale produced by 
the combination of a common and free internal market and the single currency, the euro. 
De Grauwe (2012) got evidence to show that members of the Eurozone experienced 
asymmetric shocks displaying a clear divide among the northern and southern Eurozone 
countries; (v) there is the possibility for Eurozone member nations to have incentive to adopt huge fiscal deficits/public debts and therefore ‘free ride on other members’ of the 
monetary zone which eventually finance them, provided exchange rates risks are not 
incurred;31(vi) in the Eurozone, there would be asymmetric shocks that could be avoided 
(or its effects reduced) if a single or common fiscal policy is in place either through a large 
common treasury or a common budget of a large European fund with the purpose of 
helping affected members. This is one of the essentials for a single currency. The point 
here is that the whole of Europe lacks fiscal integration; (vii) if a monetary union as 
depicted by the Eurozone is to increase, this cannot be made possible without a high-
flying fiscal union. Eventually, such fiscal union is expected to lead a political union 
manifested by a common parliament and executive powers or a confederation of states. 
5.3 Overly Optimisms of the Eurozone's Founding Fathers  
Gibson, Palives and Tavlas (2013), while presenting an analytical overview of the euro 
area crisis, highlighted three reasons for the optimism of European political leaders and 
economists on the success of a monetary union  (like the euro area) even despite the 
presence of asymmetry shocks and the absence adequate adjustment mechanism. These 
reasons were: (a) if at the national levels, sound fiscal policies are maintained, the 
incidence (and the resultant effects) of fiscal-induced asymmetric would be minimised 
(Krugman, 2012); (b) towards reducing the impacts of symmetric shocks, national policy 
makers would apply structural reforms (given the reduced ability to use the demand side 
policies to counter asymmetric shocks) which may include the freeing of labour and 
products markets; (c) it would be easier to evaluate the nature of risks and consequently 
appraise investment opportunities within the euro area due to the belief that the euro 
would eliminate exchange rate risks from national interest rates.32 The Eurozone crisis 
                                                          
31This opens the flaws of a single fiscal authority in Eurozone as necessitated by the need fiscal discipline on all 
Eurozone members. 
32Fernadez-Villaverde, Garciano and Santos (2013). 
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revealed that there was overly optimism about the success of the euro because of the high 
hopes of the application of necessary fiscal and structural measures of euro’s success by 
the Eurozone members. The underpinnings of the theory of monetary integration as put 
forward at the end the 1990s were therefore, incomplete in the EMU. 
5.4 Principal Factors of the Eurozone's Financial System Failure  
Coming from the novel explanations of the Eurozone crisis in relation to the augmented 
logic of the Mundell-Fleming Policy Trilema’, Dymski (2013) raised some points on 
factors neglected by the design of the monetary zone stating that regarding the Mundell-
Fleming trilema, the Eurozone neglected the Fleming’s Keynesian modeling but took after Mundell’s approach. This means that the Eurozone emphasised pre-determined rules guiding the behaviour of government and a ‘wide flow of market forces, disciplined by financial flows’, while identifying the second flaw in this respect as the failure of the 
Eurozone to pay attention to the growing powers of the globalised finance. Stemming 
from these is bank regulation/bank behaviour trilemma which reveals the consequences 
of the economic architecture of the Eurozone precluding ‘adequate bank and financial market supervision’ and prohibiting the ‘lender-of-last-resort intervention’ despite simultaneously enabling ‘hyper-competition among financial intermediaries’. These are 
some of the principal factors that led the Eurozone’s financial system into crisis as the 
configuration of the Eurozone is such that could not calm the financial sectors of the euro 
area down and while burdened by problematic banking sectors, financial stability could 
not be ensured. Though there were global financial deregulation and revolution in 
macroeconomic theory and policy making as at the time of designing the Eurozone, Feldstein (1997) observed that out of the Mudell’s four criteria for an OCA, the Eurozone 
met just one (which is labour mobility) and failed the other three tests.33 
5.5 Non-convergence of the Booms and the Busts at the Union Level  De Grauwe (2013) restated his 1999 comparison of the Eurozone as ‘a beautiful villa in 
which Europeans were ready to enter; yet, it was a villa that did not have a roof. As long 
as the weather was fine, we would like to have settled in the villa. We would regret it when the weather turned ugly.’ He added that the Eurozone’s design failures have ‘become even more manifest as the ones that were perceived before the start’. It was 
                                                          
33 These three areas of failures manifested in: (i) inflexible domestic prices and wages; (ii) minimal fiscal transfers across Eurozone member countries’ borders; and (iii) heterogeneity in shocks , in which shocks do not have similar 
effects. 
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further highlighted that ‘the Eurozone look like a wonderful construction at the time it was built, yet it appeared to be loaded with design failures.’ The origin of the design 
failure was traced to two factors: (i) booms and bust dynamics; and (ii) lack of stabilisers. 
The first argument was that the endogenous dynamics of booms and busts continued to 
work at the national levels and that these were not incorporated into the union-wide 
dynamics. While money and monetary policies in the Eurozone are fully centralised, other 
macroeconomic policies are left firmly in the hands of the national governments, thus causing ‘idiosyncratic movements’ which the existence of euro could not constrain. 
Consequently, the Eurozone has very little to make the booms and the busts converge at the Eurozone’s level. These booms and busts have the origins of their own lives at the national levels and could not become a ‘common boom-and-bust dynamics' at the monetary union’s level. The worse scenario highlighted by De Grawe (2013)  was how 
Eurozone level booms and busts can be affected at the national levels given the fact that the union’s single interest imposed on all Eurozone’s members by the ECB is ‘too low for 
the booming countries and too high for the countries in recession’. In the booming 
countries, the union-wide single interest rate translates to low real interest rate, in effect 
magnifying the boom. On the other hand, the single interest rate yield high real interest 
rates in countries with recession/low growth, thereby causing further economic 
devastation. The fact is that single interest rate exacerbates the feasible difference between ‘the booming’ and ‘the busting’, making the booming countries to be further 
boomed while the busting countries moves further into recession than when the 
monetary union was not in existence. The second argument was that the stabiliser that 
existed at the national levels before the beginning of the monetary union was stripped 
away from the Eurozone members ‘without being transposed at the monetary union level’. The lender-of-last-resort function of central banks is the fundamental stabilising 
force existing at the national levels at the start of the Eurozone. What came suddenly, by 
the implication was that Eurozone’s member countries had to issue debt in euro on which 
they no longer have control. National governments, thereafter, were unable to guarantee 
the availability of cash to roll its debts over.34This made the Eurozone member states to be ‘naked’ and ‘fragile’ and unable to deal with coming national disturbance (De Grauwe, 
2013). What the architects of the Eurozone could not understand in the design was that 
                                                          
34 This was possible before the start of the Eurozone when member states were issuing debts in their national home 
currencies and were able to guarantee the availability of cash to repay debt at maturities. 
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the lack of guarantee could trigger self-fulfilling liquidity crises caused by a ‘sudden stop’ 
which could plunge member countries further into solvency problem.35Apart from 
liquidity problems turning into solvency crisis, affected Eurozone members were forced 
to switch off the automatic stabiliser in the budget, scramble for cash, go into austerity, 
hence cutting expenditure and raising taxes and revenue.36 
5.6 The Euro, not perceived a symbol of a Common European Identity  Colombatto (2000) opines that ‘in sharp contrast with historical precedents, the euro was 
not perceived a symbol of a common European identity, either at the beginning of the 
1990s or back in the 1960s when the project for a Europe common currency was first conceived’. This was based on the premise in the contributions of Cohen (1993) and 
Bordo and Jonung (1999) as these literatures are able to show that political unification 
preceded all past monetary unions that later adopted common currency; but contrary in 
the case of the Eurozone, the justification for monetary union was provided by the idea 
of political union. The collapse of the Bretton Woods System as well as the collapse of the 
US dollars gave the support for a European common currency in the 1960s as these 
eventually caused the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the 
European Currency Unit (ECU). The contrast picture of the support for the Eurozone in the 1990s painted by Feldstein, (as cited by Colombatto, 2000) emanated from the ‘desire 
to replace discredited national policy makers with foreign, allegedly independent 
technocrats or from the Franco-German desire to establish political hegemony’.  
5.7  Euro is Illegitimate  
In this same light, further conclusion made by Colombatto (2000) was that the euro lacks 
the legitimacy.37It was claimed that the euro has scanty legitimacy because the European 
political ideal itself lacks legitimacy. The proposal for the euro (and Eurozone) was seen to tend to be ‘assimilated to a matter of monetary coordination, a concept with long tradition and little effectiveness in the European debate’. From the viewpoints of 
European public, the common currency was regarded as something vague, which is 
temporarily remote, thus causing the gradual neglect of the implication of the euro for 
centralised policy making.38 Many literature affirm that the idea of the EMU became 
                                                          
35Ireland, Spain and Portugal experienced this. 
36 De Grauwe (2013) 
37 De Jasay (1995) considered an institutional arrangement to be legitimate if it is accepted in the absence of 
incentives or sanctions. 
38 (Colombatto, 2000). 
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political when the ‘questionable legitimacy’ of the euro became obvious just as some 
European countries (like the UK, Scandinavia) perceived the euro as a political 
phenomenon from the beginning. The claim by Colombatto (2000) was that the principle 
of harmonisation and the introduction of the euro are not independent in the context of 
the EU where the single currency ceased to be mere monetary technicality which only 
became political matter for the sake of harmonisation. In this context, the principle of 
harmonisation relates to the manifestation of two properties of the OCA: (i) 
harmonisation in the context of bringing about homogeneities in production structures 
and in institutional conditions which make asymmetric shocks less disruptive; (ii) 
harmonisation in situation where substantial transfer from one group of member nation 
to another would compensate and smooth out potential divergences with the currency 
area. Obradovic (1996) explained that most European countries have different traditions 
and history, value systems, institutions and myths; and that across countries in Europe, huge variance between the ‘actual condition’ and the ‘rule of law ideal’ caused the 
proliferation of different systems of informal rules and consequently, different culture 
(particularly, in the Western Europe). The elimination of these differences would take 
time and highly possible to be catastrophic. Attempts to force institutional homogeneity 
in the Eurozone through the introduction of new and common system of codified rules 
that ignore local traditions and cultures in Europe would result in tension and crisis 
within Eurozone.39 One further source of ambiguity in the establishment of the Eurozone 
and the introduction of the euro was the heterogenous perception (within Europe) of the 
political consequences of the EMU. A group of countries (within the EU) aimed at achieving ‘continental supremacy and world status through political integration.40The 
other group of countries (within the EU) gave support to the EMU project with the view of EMU as ‘a means of protecting and covering their allegedly incompetent (national) 
political elites (Italy); and also that monetary integration is protective devise to avoid catastrophic (or less desirable) scenarios’.41 
 
                                                          
39 (Colombatto, 2000) 
40 Once the euro area integrated into a new federal organisation, these countries hope to emerge as much stronger 
contenders in the international community. Their leaders would have enhanced their own prestige and authority in 
the domains of ordinary policy making and law bargaining as well as their importance in historical perspective, being 
the founding fathers of a new political entity with a crucial role in the world(Colombatto, 2000) 
41 Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal would have certainly considered the cost of staying out of the Eurozone as 
greater that the cost of staying within. 
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6 Eurozone Crisis Lesson for Proposed Monetary Integration of Africa 
It is important to note that the OCA theory was (as of then) developed by Mundell, 
McKinnon and Kenen to describe all that were required for the smooth operation of a 
monetary union within blocs that were already existing as federations (the US and 
Canada). The theory did not mention anything about the necessary pre-requisites and 
other factors (now exposed by the Eurozone crisis); some of which are: (i) political 
requisite necessary for proposed monetary unions. Apart from this, the theory (as well 
as its subsequent developments), was silent on the need for a banking union to be 
incorporated in a monetary union; and also failed to see banks (or banking) propagating 
asymmetries of shocks. The reasons adduced to this was the tight regulations and 
constrained operations of banking when the OCA theory was developed in the 1960's; (ii) 
selective emigration of highly skilled labour from adverse-shock hit regions of the 
currency union (which led to serious brain drain in the Eurozone due to the long-lived, 
deep adverse shock suffered by the EMU periphery since 2010;  (iii) the need for a 'lender 
of last resort' central bank in a monetary union, because the sovereign debt and banking 
crises of the 1930s were never anticipated; (iv) the necessity for an orderly sovereign 
debt restructuring mechanism whenever a monetary union member having no recourse 
to inflation tax, inherited debt overhang. This is because the prototype existing monetary 
union members within the US (States) and Canada (Provinces) were not characterised by 
such degree of debts as those experienced by the Eurozone members; (v) The 
requirement of further political integration for fiscal integration or if the compatibility of 
limited fiscal integration and limited political integration would be adequate for a 
monetary union to function effectively. 
In spite of the desire for stronger regional cooperation and links and the fact that single 
currency project cannot be separated from politics, the African regional monetary 
cooperation project differs in two areas: (a) firstly, because of the low intra-regional trade 
in African ( as evident by studies applying the gravity model), the harmful impact of 
having various currencies in Africa are not huge; (b) secondly, regional integration in 
Africa is not advanced as it was as at the launch of the euro (Masson, 2006). In African 
union as well as the various economic communities in the regions of Africa, there are no 
parliaments, community institutions and a functioning custom union. Therefore a 
common central bank may not benefit from the support of community institutions that 
may justify the creation of monetary unions in Africa. This makes the efforts towards 
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monetary integration of the continent of Africa as those facilitating regional integration 
in political and other context or dimensions, rather than the culmination of the process.42 
Instead of the benefits of lower transaction costs that monetary integration offers, an 
African monetary union could be desirably essential in propelling regional integration 
from four fronts: (i) increasing the African countries' clout (particularly in international 
trade transactions); (ii) expanding intra-regional trade with the associated economies of 
scale advantage and benefits of efficiency that could be derived from increase in 
competition; (iii) contributing to political solidarity as well as in reducing international 
conflicts within the African continent; (iv) serving as self-control instrument against 
macroeconomic policies that are not sustainable (for instance, by exerting 'peer pressure' 
on national government and insulating regional central bank from national treasuries 
(Masson, 2006).   
Given these, what were not anticipated by the OCA theory founding fathers, but now 
exposed by the Eurozone crisis, offer some crucial and essential lessons for the smooth 
operations of proposed monetary unions in the Africa as well as the overall African 
continent's monetary integration project. Regardless of the above conclusions on African 
monetary integration by Masson (2006), some lessons from the Eurozone crisis would be 
of immense value for the African monetary integration of Africa. Some these lessons are 
as expressed in the following paragraphs: 
Lesson 1:  Gradual process of monetary integration transition for Africa: Although, 
the literature have revealed mixed conclusions about monetary cooperation within the 
sub-regions of Africa, still, the Eurozone crisis has disclosed that monetary integration 
and fixed exchange rate cooperation is always opened to crisis if countries involves in the 
arrangement allow imbalances to grow out of hand due to the failure of the affected 
countries to internally adjust their economies. The competitiveness of a monetary union 
member country would be by the appreciation of real exchange rate when economic 
policies find it difficult keeping the competitiveness of the price levels at national 
domestic levels with the rest of the countries within the monetary union. While external 
adjustment through exchange rate manipulations are ruled out, current account deficits 
emanating from this may possibly generate balance of payment crisis. Because of the 
economic and political divergences of the EMU, macroeconomic imbalances were 
                                                          
42 Masson (2006) 
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worsened. The financial crisis in the Eurozone reflected clear over-ambition in monetary 
and exchange rate integration of Europe in spite of these divergences. This is a lesson for 
the African monetary integration as the continent (as well as its sub-regions) may suffer 
the after-effect and possible economic/financial crisis if sub-regional exchange rates (and 
monetary integration) are not gradually implemented. These require member countries' 
commitments and political agreements as well as monetary and fiscal (macroeconomic) 
coordination of member countries of the proposed monetary unions. For the purpose of 
the economic adjustment mentioned above and 'flexibility', such gradual steps in 
monetary integration at the African sub-regions are essentially necessary with huge 
commitments, trusts and the willingness of proposed member countries to cooperate, 
defend and uphold the agreed exchange rate regime. Nike Theory (the 'just-do-it' theory) 
and the Coronation Theory (the 'Bundesbank view') are the two schools of thoughts at 
the pre-Europe monetary unification and which the proponents of the African monetary 
cooperation should evaluate. All the same, the benefits of hindsight have flawed the 
former while the latter appeared to have been vindicated.43  
Lesson 2: Asymmetric shocks are natural, inherent and in-built: The OCA theory 
regarded the aggregate disturbance pattern (symmetry and asymmetry) as a guiding 
criterion exogenous in deciding to participate in a monetary union. There are some 
theoretical underpinnings of the shock pattern across potential monetary union 
members. Mundell (1961) speculated that the western region of the US and Canada might 
be a natural monetary union because of their resource endowment similarities and the 
industrial structures differences between eastern and western regions of North America. 
There were, however, some exceptions to the exogeneity rule from the EMU's 
perspective.44 There would be increase in asymmetric shock (as long as shocks are 
industry-specific) when member states of a monetary union are more specialised in 
different industries, due to more inter-industry trade. More intra-industry trade causes 
the industrial structures within the monetary union to display further overlap that would 
reduce asymmetric shocks. Another exception that centres on the sourcing of asymmetric 
                                                          
43 The 'just-do-it' theory (the Nike Theory) points to endogenous economic convergence soon after the completion of 
monetary integration while the 'Bundesbank view' (the Coronation Theory) is with the argument that the long 
convergence and political process receive the crowning achievement of a monetary union. 
44 Frankel and Rose (1998) highlight that monetary integration of the Europe could cause changes in industrial 
structures perceived as the asymmetric shock source. 
31 | P a g e  
 
shocks from different levels of economic development provided a linkage between the 
shocks and other forms of anxieties within a monetary union.  
Within the Eurozone, there are the 'core' and the 'periphery' and the economic 
development gap between these two categories is wide. This is an identified problem 
within the Eurozone with some implications for the African 'core' and 'periphery' 
countries. Walters (1990) opined about the unlikelihood of quick inflation convergence 
across the EMU as an exception. The 'periphery countries' record higher inflation rate 
with the consequence of lower interest rates operating across these countries if the 
uniform nominal interest rates operate across the Eurozone; and this would lead to 
destabilising asymmetric shock consequences stemming from unsustainable 
consumption and boom in investment in the periphery countries as witnessed during the 
Eurozone crisis. There were booms in the periphery countries' construction spending (in 
Ireland and Spain), consumption spending (in Portugal) and government spending (in 
Greece) due to reduced costs of borrowing. These spending booms were largely financed 
by large cross-border capital flows from the Eurozone's 'core' to the 'periphery' causing 
equally huge current account imbalances (deficits and surpluses for the 'periphery and 
the 'core' respectively). There was 'sudden stop' of these capital inflows in 2009/2010 
due to sustainability problems and this imparted damaging and weakening asymmetric 
hocks within the Eurozone.  
Lesson 3: The need for banking union in the proposed monetary union of African 
diverse countries with proposed common currency: The Eurozone crisis has obviously 
revealed that banking union is required in a monetary union. Such banking union should 
be expected to encompass single financial rules and regulations, a single banking 
supervision, a well-funded single resolution mechanism for 'bad' banks and harmonised 
deposit insurance. These are essential whenever banks are involved in cross-border 
capital flows, given the destabilising effects of the inadequate supervision and regulation 
of a cross-border lending policies. In the event of insolvency of banks and the absence of 
orderly resolution mechanism, bail-out was seen as the only alternative. This promoted 
moral hazards, caused bank under-capitalisation problem, negatively affected the 
solvency of national governments that were responsible for bank capitalisation, and 
increased the spirits of robotic banks and companies. If not well addressed, this problems 
could lead to decline confidence in banking systems, spilling beyond the specific 
countries. Unfortunately, this is an issue not addressed by the OCA theory. 
32 | P a g e  
 
The Eurozone as a monetary zone, is deficient of cross-border banking or federal banking 
unlike in the US monetary zone. The provision of banking services by the cross-border 
banks or federal banks like Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase and Well Fargo 
enable the US not to be badly hit by the financial crisis which emanated from the country. 
Funding costs and credit expansion criteria of these banks were determined nationwide 
(at the monetary union level). These made loan seekers to face uniform sets of credit and 
financial criteria and conditions in all banks irrespective of the state within the US. The 
Eurozone is however, a contrasting case in which most of the banking operating and 
headquartered in individual EMU countries. In the instance of Spain, Spanish banks 
undertook virtually all the Spanish banking operations, and many of these Spanish banks 
are not well-exposed (with little banking activities) beyond the shores of Spain. Hence, 
when the financial crisis came, Spain and the Spanish banking were badly affected, while 
the government had to come up with salvaging the situation in the absence of alternatives 
like a banking union. Generally, the Eurozone member countries could not strongly cope 
with the additional burden without adverse effect on their credit ratings which further 
caused credit ratings of most banks in the affected countries (like Greece, Ireland, Spain 
etc) to drop. This led to the general economic downturn stemming from stiffer credit 
terms and conditions as well as interest rate increase with lowered economic activities 
and government fiscal revenue. Nevertheless, citing the case of the Eurozone's Cyprus, 
Goodhart (2014) argues that a mechanism to bail-in the local bank creditors would be 
more attractive than common deposit insurance and common resolution fund 
incorporated in banking union.45 The Cypriot case discouraged banks and taxpayers in 
stronger Eurozone countries (in the north) from supporting the weaker economies (in 
the south). The effect of the bail-in of the uninsured depositors may cause banks' large 
depositor to flee to north whenever financial crisis is coming up because the bail-in may 
imply the imposition of losses on local residents, fortify the doom-loop as well as increase 
the likelihood of contagion across member states. Germany consequently came up with 
the view that banking union within a monetary union is better in the long-run, and not in 
the short-run and further that it should not serve as solution mechanism for adverse 
downward spiral interaction between national governments, economies and banks 
                                                          
45 In Cyprus, in recapitalising local Cypriot banks, the major adverse effect fell on uninsured depositors. 
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(Goodhart, 2014). Therefore, without banking union, African monetary union project 
may fail. 
Lesson 4: Instituting banking systemic fragility/instability prevention mechanism: 
At the eventual launch of monetary union (at the continent and sub-continent levels), 
appropriate mechanism should be put in place to strengthen national financial systems 
and thus prevent national banks from falling into crisis. One of the measure that are 
necessary here is the enforcement of capital requirements higher than the capital 
adequacy requirements prescribed by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS). Apart 
from this, the levels of bank capitalisation should be regularly monitored and reviewed 
for long run stability of the banking systems as guide against banking system fragility.46  
Lesson 5: Forestalling fiscal extravagance and associated painful effects: Unchecked 
public sector spending and fiscal recklessness/complacency (as in the case of the 
Eurozone's Greece) should be obviated by prospective members of the proposed African 
monetary unions in order to avoid possible cost of market-imposed fiscal adjustment 
which may be painful and unbearable. In the Eurozone’s, pains from the fiscal 
adjustments took the form of fiscal austerity measures which precluded affected member 
countries from offsetting the adverse impact of budget contradictions on economic 
activities and employment, by applying independent monetary policy and exchange rate 
policy as implied by membership of the monetary union. 
Lesson 6: Assessing public finance sustainability at the pre-take-off stage of the 
African monetary integration project: The dynamics of public debt in the Eurozone 
countries, more or less, witnessed stability around 10 pre-crisis years. The standard 
equations of public debt dynamics indicates that if a country's interest rate on debt is 
more than the nominal GDP growth, it is necessary for such country to stabilise the 
debt/GDP ratio by running a sufficiently large primary budget surplus. This is a condition 
lacking in the case of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in the wake of the financial crisis 
when public debts in these countries increased. 
Lesson 7: An unsustainable debt restructuring mechanism is essential for the African 
monetary union project: Automatic fiscal stabilisers can stabilise the heavily indebted 
countries within a monetary union if there are mechanisms for removing debt overhangs. 
The case of Greece in the Eurozone erupted the generalisation that heavy indebtedness 
                                                          
46 The 2%-3% bank equity/total (non-risky-weighted) asset recommended for banks with East Asian banks by 
Admati and Hellwig (2013) is equally advisable for banks within the proposed African monetary unions. 
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is a significant obstacle to the use of automatic fiscal stabilisers around the subsequent 
application of market-based sovereign debt exchanges within the monetary union as 
basis for higher degree of stability. Because of the great scope for contagion, member 
countries of the Eurozone have fewer alternative means or mechanism for handling the 
debt crises within the union, apart from the bail-out brought about by the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM).47   
Lesson 8: Envisaging possible sovereign government-banking system loop at the pre-
take-off stage of the African monetary cooperation project: There is a strong link 
between the sovereign and banks in the Eurozone. This was not taken into cognisance in 
the pre-crisis period. This is a feature of weakness that should not be ignored by member 
countries of the African monetary unions at all levels. Within the Eurozone, with the 
absence of a unified and integrated banking resolution institution and framework at the 
union's level, it is the responsibility of each member government to rescue its domestic 
banking system from collapse. A major consequence in countries with large banking 
system was the risks inherent in such banking system rescue, particularly increased and 
apparent huge public finance deterioration for the rescuing governments in the form of 
banking recapitalisation and rescue packaging costs. 
Lesson 9: Avoidance of the design of problematic financial systems: African financial 
markets are broadly bank-based. Even in the face of weak and badly structured financial 
systems (grossly lacking the existence of capital markets), African monetary unions 
should avoid instituting awkward and problematic financial structures at the sub-regions 
and the regional level of monetary cooperation. This is to avoid replica of hurting effects 
of the faulty designs of the Eurozone's financial system that are apparent in the 
contradictions in the homogeneous interbank market which happened to be 
characterised by dissimilar heterogeneous banking markets. 
Lesson 10: Enhanced surveillance and monitoring of regional financial markets: 
There is every possibility of financial crisis spreading like wild fire among the integrated 
economies within a monetary union through financial or trade channels or a combination 
                                                          
47 It is a mechanism that should immunise sovereign from legal actions by holdouts in situations of approved debt 
restructuring.  Debt restructuring should be set as a pre-condition when assessing lending under the mechanism in 
case sovereign debts go beyond the pre-agreed limit. 
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of the two. This therefore justifies the institution of high-powered management of capital 
flows risks. Since no country within an integrated region can detach itself from financial 
troubles and risks apparent in the regional environment (due to the lack high degree of 
interdependences), prevention and management of financial crisis (within the contexts 
of regional crisis management) and crisis management strategies would prevent financial 
crisis occurrence at the monetary regional levels as well as take care of the volatilities 
international capital flows. This serves as complement to other related global initiatives. 
A major lesson here is for the members of the proposed African monetary unions at the 
sub-regional levels (and finally at the continental level) to work towards enhancing the 
monetary union's design/architecture, further to the enhancement of regulatory 
capacities at national levels as well as financial cooperation at the international level. It 
is therefore essential for the regulatory focus to go beyond micro-prudential regulation 
and supervision of individual financial institutions and work in favour of the 
identification and management of inter-linkage and market-interdependent system risks. 
For the proposed African monetary union, this would prevent crisis-activating events like 
large financial institution failure from impairing national financial markets and the 
intending member’s economies at large.  
Lesson 11: A normal central bank is desirable for the African monetary union project: 
The common bank for a monetary union should go beyond just following monetary rules 
(inflation targeting, Taylor rule, money supply growth etc); but should be conscious of 
performing the role of lender of last resort, stabilising the  union's payment system and 
banking system supervision. The ECB has narrow scope and focus by operating less than 
a normal central bank. This does not have good implications for the future of a single 
currency and the economies of such monetary union. In line with the degree of 
independence, the extent of accountability of proposed African common central banks 
should be made strong. A strong political institution should be established to exert 
control over such common central banks. 
Lesson 12: The necessity for crisis prevention and crisis resolution mechanisms: The 
inferences from the Eurozone crisis as well as the Asian financial crisis pointed to the 
view that it is difficult to establish and coordinate crisis resolution mechanism in the 
middle of stormy economic and financial crisis. It is evident that the two monetary 
integrated region were totally unprepared to face the crisis and the after-effects thereof, 
thus pushing this huge tasks to the multilateral monetary and financial organisations at 
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global and continental levels.48 Because of the contagious adverse nature of financial and 
banking crisis and the vulnerabilities to external shocks, it is important that effective and 
well-functioning crisis resolution mechanism are established at the formation stages of 
the African monetary union in the direction of ensuring sufficient preparations for 
preventing financial crisis, providing prompt/swift response to crisis as well as the 
avoidance of unnecessary frictions during the crisis.49  
Lesson 13: Proper evaluation of the costs/benefits of international financial 
integration within the African monetary integration plans: The neo-classical 
theoretical prediction of automatic capital allocation efficiency as a propeller of 
international financial integration was proved wrong by the Eurozone crisis. Efficient 
allocation of capital as expected by the Europe's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was not 
assured/guaranteed, rather unsustainable financial imbalances and bubbles were 
developed out of the Eurozone's unrestricted financial integration. There was under-
pricing of sovereign risks in the Europe, followed by very poor debt repayment abilities 
of sovereign debts while much needed funds were nowhere thus leading to forced, painful 
overdue adjustments.50 These were equally experienced by some developing and 
emerging economies in which the 'halt', 'sudden stop' and capital flows reversals are the 
repercussive 'capital flow bonanzas' that stemmed from the period of strong 
unsustainable output growth. Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) established that this 
development is incessant in international finance modern era. Therefore the Eurozone 
experience should prompt the African monetary union initiatives to properly evaluate 
the costs and benefits of international financial integration within the context of 
proposed monetary integration of the continent in the consideration of the capital 
account management and international flow regulation in the determination of long term 
benefits and costs. Cross border activities of banks and financial institutions escalated 
systematic risks within a monetary union and challenges in the area of regulations. 
Therefore, working towards monetary and financial integration and single markets at the 
African sub-regional levels, high degree of care is necessary in taking too fast financial 
market liberalisations both at the continental and sub-continental levels. 
                                                          
48 The attempt to set up a functioning Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) failed.   
49 Volz (2013). 
50 Volz (2013). 
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The low level of developments in the African financial markets (particularly, the capital 
markets) is a point of concern at this point. Nevertheless, sound evaluation of the African 
monetary integration should answer the question pertaining to the extent of the 
integration of the financial market sectors which are beneficial in monetary integration 
process, having in mind the risk contagion effects of increases in international finance (as 
evident by the case of Greece within the Eurozone). As part of the lessons from the 
Eurozone crisis, proposed developments of monetary integration of the African sub-
regions necessitate excellent financial architecture that would put regional cross-border 
financial regulatory and supervisory bodies (within a structure of supranational 
regulation) in place in order to guide cross-border financial flows, financial services 
restrictions and the liberalisation of financial regulations at the domestic national levels. 
Lesson 14: Need to have the consciousness of Africa's political and socio-cultural 
differences: Unlike the successful monetary integration in the US, the Eurozone is made 
up of members' countries having separate and different systems of government, separate 
law making machinery (parliament), independent and government, different culture and 
social beliefs. In working in favour of their sustainability and independence, it is therefore 
necessary for the proposed African monetary unions to address fiscal dominance at 
national levels in which politicians would frown at economic policy reforms and bank 
dominance in which banks might not be bothered about banking operation calamities, 
but rather about enhanced return on equity. 
Lesson 15: Need to establish strong direct link and relationship between inflation 
target and fiscal targets: The future African monetary union should evolve a design that 
would not make price stability targets to be an obsession with fiscal targets. The 
architecture of African monetary unions should hugely focus on price stability and 
inflation target through the design that would prompt the avoidance of inflation 
differentials among prospective members in the monetary integration and enforce 
adherence to long term inflation targets and fiscal targets. The size of budget balance 
(deficits) and public debt should be made to affect inflationary performances of the 
prospective members.  
 
 
 
 
 
38 | P a g e  
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, the history of monetary integration of the Europe was traced and the 
establishment of European Monetary Union (EMU) was evaluated within the context of 
the properties optimal currency area theory. Defects in the architectural design of the 
Eurozone as exposed by the financial crisis were identified and lessons were drawn from 
these for the monetary integration of Africa.  
The financial–crisis-exposed major flaws in the design of the Eurozone include (i) the 
absence of effective economic governance mechanism; (ii) the retention of banking 
supervision and resolution at national levels; (iii) the lack of financial back-stops and 
crisis resolution mechanisms at the union level; and (iv) defects in the design of the 
Eurozone's common central bank. For the African monetary integration initiatives, this 
research works gathered several lessons from the identified defects in Eurozone’s 
architecture.  
Some of the Eurozone crisis-prompted lessons derived for the monetary integration 
initiatives and plans for Africa in general and the economic and monetary sub-regions of 
Africa in particular suggest that:  (1) there is need for gradual process of monetary 
integration transition for Africa; (2) asymmetric shocks are natural, inherent and in-
built; (3) banking union is essential for the proposed monetary union of African diverse 
countries with proposed common currency; (4) it is necessary to institute banking 
systemic fragility/instability prevention mechanism; (5) fiscal extravagance and 
associated painful effects should be forestall; (6) public finance sustainability should be 
evaluated at the pre-take-off stage of the African monetary cooperation project; (7) a 
mechanism for the restructuring of  unsustainable debt is essential for the African 
monetary union project; (8) possible sovereign government-banking system loop 
should be envisaged at the pre-take-off stage of the African monetary cooperation 
project; (9) the design of problematic financial systems should be avoided; (10) the 
enhancement of  surveillance and monitoring of regional financial markets is necessary; 
(11) a normal, traditional central bank is desirable for the African monetary union 
project; (12) there is necessity for crisis prevention and crisis resolution mechanisms; 
(13) proper evaluation of the costs/benefits of international financial integration within 
the African monetary integration plans should be undertaken; (14) there is need to have 
the consciousness of Africa's political and socio-cultural differences; (15) strong direct 
link and relationship between inflation target and fiscal targets is vital. 
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